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I. INTRODUCTION
This article addresses the Restatement of Employment Law,
Chapter 1, on the "Existence of Employment Relationship." The
Labor Law Group previously responded to a draft version of this
chapter.! This article will not revisit all the considerations discussed in
that article. Instead, it will focus on three issues within this topic that
have become increasingly important in recent years that the
Restatement does not adequately address. These three issues are: the
joint employer relationship; the use of unpaid interns; and the rise of
the "gig" economy, with its attendant questions about employee
status in enterprises such as Uber or Lyft. The article addresses these
issues in turn, and then closes by touching on a few of the most
important issues left unresolved from the draft to the final version of
the Restatement.
II. THE JOINT EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP
"Fissured" work arrangements in which multiple entities are
responsible for different aspects of employees' working conditions are
becoming increasingly common.2  Indeed, franchising and
subcontracting has become the dominant form of arranging work in
many industries responsible for the employment of millions. Thus,
when these arrangements give rise to a joint employment relationship
is a question that is only growing in importance.3 Yet, the Restatement
1. Dennis Nolan et al., Working Group on Chapter 1 of the Proposed Restatement of
Employment Law: Existence of Employment Relationship, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 43
(2009) [hereinafter Working Group].
2. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 7-8 (2014) (providing examples, including
that "[tioday, more than 80% of [hotel] staff are employed by hotel franchisees and supervised
by separate management companies that bear no relation to the brand name of the property
where they work"). For a discussion of the fissured workplace and relevant legal rules in
historical context through the present see Matthew Finkin, The Legal Ambiguity of Fissured
Work in the United States, in THE NOTION OF EMPLOYER IN THE ERA OF THE FISSURED
WORKPLACE 7 (Hiroya Nakakubo & Takashi Araki eds., 2017).
3. It may well be that the concept of joint employment and reliance on the traditional
definition of "employer" generally will prove inadequate to deal with the modern, fissured
economy with its complex and convoluted relationships between entities and workers. For such
an argument, see Alan Hyde, Nonemployer Responsibility for Labor Conditions, in WHO IS AN
EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
68TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR ch. 23 (2016) (proposing a concept of "responsibility"
for labor conditions instead of the traditional "employer" analysis). While such a model is
beyond the scope of an article critiquing a Restatement of law, it is worth noting that the
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hardly describes the existing approaches, and does not take a position
on which is best.
Restatement section 1.04(b) provides that:
(b) An individual is an employee of two or more joint employers if
(i) the individual renders services to at least one of the employers
and (ii) that employer and the other joint employers each control
or supervise such rendering of services as provided in § 1.01(a)(3).
This language does not resolve a key issue in current case law,
including but not limited to law under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA):4 whether an employer's "control" over employees must
be regularly, actually exercised, or whether "indirect" or "potential"
control is sufficient. However, the NLRB recently addressed this
issue in detail.
A. The Joint-Employment Test from Browning-Ferris Industries of
California: Potential or Indirect Control
One of the most high-profile labor and employment law cases in
recent years was the decision of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) in a joint employment case. In Browning-Ferris Industries of
California,' the NLRB appeared to adjust course on the standard for
finding joint employer status. While the NLRB insisted that it was
merely returning to an older, but not radically different, rule - a view
that we share, as described below - the case caused a great deal of
concern in the employer community. While the case did not involve a
franchising relationship, much of the uproar following Browning-
Ferris Industries of California was focused on potential impacts in
franchisor-franchisee cases, including a pending case alleging that
McDonald's is a joint employer along with its franchises.
In this 2015 decision, the NLRB first stated that it was
reaffirming the rule from a 1982 Third Circuit case with a similar
name, NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Pennsylvania. First,
approach endorsed below is hardly radical.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012).
5. 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015).
6. For example, in response to this case, Texas, Tennessee, and Louisiana passed laws
stating that franchisors are generally not employers of employees of the franchisor's franchisee.
See Jess A. Dance, States Come Out Swinging Against New Joint-Employer Test, LAW360 (Sept.
22, 2015, 11:05 AM), <https://www.1aw360.com/articles/703857/states-come-out-swinging-
against-new-joint-employer-test> (discussing Texas S.B. 652, Tennessee S.B. 475, and Louisiana
H.B. 464). Also, a House panel considered a bill to overturn Browning-Ferris of California. See
Lawrence Dub6, House Panel Considers NLRA Joint Employer Bill, 188 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) AA-1 (Sept. 29, 2015).
7. 691 F.2d 1117, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1982).
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the NLRB noted that this rule featured an inclusive vision of subjects
that could lead to an employment relationship: "matters relating to
the employment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline,
supervision, and direction," a non-exhaustive list.' Other examples
included dictating the number of workers to be supplied; controlling
scheduling, seniority, and overtime; and assigning work and
determining the manner and method of work performance.'
Most importantly, the NLRB went on to clarify what it meant by
"control" over these functions, explaining that some of its cases
decided in the years between Browning-Ferris Industries of California
and Browning-Ferris Industries of Pennsylvania had imposed
additional requirements for finding joint-employer status without
sufficient authority or reasoning.'0 Specifically, the Board stated:
We will no longer require that a joint employer not only possess the
authority to control employees' terms and conditions of
employment, but also exercise that authority. Reserved authority to
control terms and conditions of employment, even if not exercised,
is clearly relevant to the joint-employment inquiry. ... Nor will we
require that, to be relevant to the joint-employer inquiry, a
statutory employer's control must be exercised directly and
immediately. If otherwise sufficient, control exercised indirectly -
such as through an intermediary - may establish joint-employer
status.11
This standard contains both the concepts of "indirect control"
and "potential" control. The NLRB's General Counsel had
specifically urged the NLRB to adopt a standard including
"potential" control.2 While the paragraph quoted above does not
specifically use the word "potential," the idea of "reserved" authority
to control captures that idea. Browning-Ferris of California did not
elaborate on the precise nature of "indirect" or "potential" control,
because, in short, both employers in that case had exercised actual
control. The only specific mention of "potential" control in the
majority opinion is in a footnote: "we agree with the General Counsel
that 'direct, indirect, and potential control over working conditions' -
at least as we have explained those concepts here - are all relevant to
the joint-employer inquiry." 3 Still, the dissent made much of this
8. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 19 (emphasis in original).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id. at 16 n.68.
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point: "Our fundamental disagreement with the majority's test is not
just that they view indicia of indirect, and even potential, control to
be probative of employer status, they hold such indicia can be
dispositive without any evidence of direct control."14
Notably, this issue is not limited to statutory interpretations of
the NLRA. The majority and dissent sparred over whether "indirect"
or "potential" control of conditions of employment could create joint
employment under common law. The majority argued that purported
requirement that a joint employer's control "be exercised and that the
exercise be direct and immediate ... is not, in fact, compelled by the
common law - and, indeed, seems inconsistent with common-law
principles."" The dissent responded that "'control' under the
common-law principles requires some direct-and-immediate
control. . ..
B. The Restatement Comment Does Not Resolve the "Indirect" or
"Potential" Control Issue
The relevant Restatement comment is not clear on this important
issue. Comment c is titled "Joint employment: rendering services that
two or more employers supervise or control." It states that
"[e]mployees can serve two or more employers who jointly or in
tandem control their rendering of services under § 1.01(a)(3)."7
Restatement section 1.01(a)(3), in turn, seems mainly concerned with
distinguishing "employees" from other categories of workers, e.g.,
independent contractors. Thus, comment c explains that the worker's
"relationship with each putative employer must effectively prevent
the individual from rendering services as an independent
businessperson."" This is not sufficient for deciding whether a joint-
employment status exists in close cases - indeed, this question is
entirely irrelevant in the significant number of cases in which the
question is whether a user employer is a joint employer along with a
supplier employer, or whether the supplier employer is the sole
employer of the employees in question."
14. Id. (Miscimarra & Johnson, dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
15. Id. at 17 (majority opinion).
16. Id. (Miscimarra & Johnson, dissenting).
17. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW §1.04 cmt.c (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
18. Id.
19. As David Weil comprehensively describes in his book, The Fissured Workplace,
subcontracting and franchising are increasingly prevalent features of modern employment. See
WEIL, supra note 2, at 8-9. While difficult joint employer questions plague these arrangements,
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Comment c continues with examples that turn on the concept of
"control" without defining that term in any detail. The comment
specifies that "a company that merely supplies to a 'user' company
individuals who work under the user-company's sole direction and
control and who are paid by the user company is not an employer of
the supplied individuals."20Also, "a company that uses and benefits
from the services of a supplying company's employees is not an
employer of the supplied employees if the company does not have the
power to direct and control their work or set their compensation."2
But what if one company had potential control, but did not exercise
it? The comment does not address this.
The comment provides several illustrations, none of which
resolve this question, and some of which arguably confuse it. In
illustration 3, one employer trains a cleaner to provide cleaning
services to an individual. The individual only tells the worker what
rooms are to be cleaned; the employer controls the manner and
means of cleaning and sets the employee's compensation. Thus, the
comment explains, the worker is an employee of the employer, but
not the individual, because the latter employer is merely a
"customer" of cleaning services. While this is probably correct
(though more information would be necessary to say for sure),
illustration 3 does little to explain why this is so. Presumably, the
individual who is benefiting from the employee's cleaning not only
does not but could not impose discipline on the employee; fire the
employee; direct the employee to clean a neighbor's house instead; or
require that the employee adopt more onerous cleaning methods.
Thus, the individual in this illustration is limited to setting the order
in which tasks will be performed; if unhappy with the cleaner, the
individual's recourse is to appeal to the employer to take action or to
cancel the contract. Illustration 4 involves workers who clean in a
contrasting fact pattern. There, the first employer pays the workers
and can discipline or reward them. The second employer's supervisors
set the workers' schedules and direct the details of their work. Given
these facts, the second employer's actual and apparently regularly and
directly asserted control over the work process creates a joint-
employment situation. Illustration 5 - like illustration 3 - makes the
those questions do not involve putative independent contractors; rather, the issue that arises in
connection with both of these arrangements i  whether the upstream employer - the franchisor
or the contractor - is an employer of the employees, in addition to the downstream employer.
20. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW §1.04 cmt. c.
21. Id.
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point that the power of a "user" employer to state what work it wants
accomplished coupled with the power of the user employer to request
a different worker from the leasing employer if the user is dissatisfied
with the worker is not enough to create joint employment. Illustration
6 involves one employer who effectively controls working time,
working conditions, and compensation, while another employer can
hire, fire, and also has power over compensation. Thus, again,
because both employers regularly exercise control directly over
employment issues, joint employment is created. Illustration 7 is a
variation on 6 in which one of the two employers does not have any
effective control over wages or details of work, and thus is not a joint
employer. Illustration 8 involves a professional sports league, in
which both the league and individual teams have power over working
conditions and compensation, thus creating joint employment.
In short, none of these illustrations involve facts that raise the
issue in Browning-Ferris of California and related precedent: what if
one of the two alleged employers has potential control over wages,
hours, or other working conditions, but that employer does not, or
has not yet, actually exercised such power, at least not directly?
C. The Reporters' Note Does Not Resolve This Issue
Nor does the reporters' note shed adequate light on this issue.
This section of the Restatement first refers to the Restatement (Third)
of Agency section 7.03, comment d(2), which provides that "[1]iability
should be allocated to the employer in the better position to take
measures to prevent the injury suffered by the third party. An
employer is in that position if the employer has the right to control an
employee's conduct."22 This mention of the "right" to control work
could support a claim of joint employment based on "potential"
control, but this remains unclear.
The note section points out that illustration 4 is based on an
NLRA case, Boire v. Greyhound Corp.23 It states that the NLRB's
joint-employer analysis under the NLRA is "similar to the analysis
courts utilize" in cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA),"24 apparently seeing Boire as the current NLRA rule. In so
22. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §7.03 cmt. d(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
23. 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
24. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.04 cmt. c, reporters' note (AM. LAW INST. 2015); see
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2012).
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doing, it cites a series of NLRA cases from 1984-2011.25 But courts
and agencies now need to address the issues raised in Browning-Ferris
of California.
Discussions of the other illustrations do not address the
"potential control" issue directly. The note section does state that
that in Antenor v. D & S Farms, the Eleventh Circuit held that bean
growers, in addition to labor contractors, were joint employers under
the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act26 and
the FLSA, because of the growers' "power to control the work and
effectively determine the compensation of the pickers."27 The
description does not specify whether such power was exercised, and
in any event this discussion does not identify or discuss this issue.
D. The NLRA and Beyond: Recent Joint-Employment Cases Under
Various Statutes
The trend to take a broader view of what may constitute joint
employment has continued both under the NLRA and other statutes.
While statutory rules may and do vary from the common law," they
often rely on it. Also, discussions of joint employment law issues
under employment law statutes are useful for their discussions of the
purpose of defining the employment relationship in the employment
law (as opposed to, say, tort law) context.
1. Related Issues Under the NLRA: Bargaining Units and
Franchising
Recent NLRB cases raise a series of other issues related to joint
employers. First, less than a year after Browning-Ferris of California,
the NLRB held, in Miller & Anderson, Inc., that unions may organize
25. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.04 cmt. c, reporters' note (citing Serv. Emps. Int'l
Union, Local 32BJ v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 435, 442-45 (2d Cir. 2011); Dunkin' Donuts v. NLRB, 363
F.3d 437, 440-41 (D.C. Cir. 2004); NLRB v. W. Temp. Serv., 821 F.2d 1258, 1266-67 (7th Cir.
1987); NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Checker Cab Co., 367 F.2d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1966); Cont'l Winding Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 122
(1991); Millcraft Paper Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 812, 813-14 (1984)).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1823 (2012).
27. 88 F.3d 925, 938 (11th Cir. 1996).
28. Comment d notes that some statutes limit obligations to one employer, even where the
common law would likely find a joint employment relationship, specifically mentioning the
Internal Revenue Code and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The FMLA
regulations define the term "joint employment" under that statute: "[w]here two or more
businesses exercise some control over the work or working conditions of the employee, the
businesses may be joint employers." 29 C.F.R. § 825.106(a) (2016). This appears to refer to
actual control, although it is not entirely clear.
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in one bargaining unit the employees of both a single employer and
those that employer jointly employed with another company.29 The
case overturned previous precedent by holding that such a unit is not
a multiemployer unit requiring the consent of both employers.3 Miller
& Anderson, Inc. did limit the user employer's obligation to bargain
as to the jointly employed employees to those subjects that are within
its control.'
Second, and more famously, the joint employment issue has
come up repeatedly in the franchising context, especially in a
recently-consolidated NLRB case involving McDonalds and a
number of its franchises.32 One report explained that this case has
been "watched closely because of the NLRB general counsel's claim
that the franchiser's indirect or potential control over fast-food
employees supports a finding that it is a joint employer with local
restaurant operators."" Current litigation against McDonalds on such
theories is also ongoing under state labor codes.34 A management-side
firm has estimated that between September 1, 2015 and May 2016,
more than fifty joint employer charges were filed in cases involving
franchisees, and eighty more charges could lead to joint employer
complaints." The Department of Labor has made it clear that
investigating potential wage and hour violations in the context of
franchisors would be a priority.36 However, General Counsel Richard
Griffin's term expires in November 2017; it is unlikely that these cases
will be resolved by then, and doubtful that a General Counsel
appointed by President Trump will continue to prosecute them. Still,
the underlying problem will remain, and the Restatement does not
29. 364 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at 8 (July 11,2016).
30. Id. at 20.
31. Id. at 15.
32. McDonald's USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB). Per an order dated October 12,
2016, this case consolidated a number of separate cases raising the same issue. See Laurence
Dub6, McDonald's Labor Board Deal May Speed Joint Employer Ruling, 198 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) AA-1 (Oct. 13, 2016).
33. Dub6, supra note 32.
34. See Cara Salvatore, McDonald's Can't Escape Franchise Workers' Pay Suit, LAw360
(Aug. 17, 2016, 2:49 PM), <https://www.1aw360.com/articles/829427/mcdonald-s-can-t-escape-
franchise-workers-pay-suit> (California law on wage payments).
35. Matthew Bultman, One Year After Browning-Ferris, Employers Decry Uncertainty,
LAW360 (Aug. 16, 2016, 7:42 PM), <https://www.1aw360.com/articles/828691/one-year-after-
browning-ferris-employers-decry-uncertainty>.
36. Benn Penn, Is Franchise Model a Recipe for Fast-Food Wage Violations, 20 Lab. Rel.
Week (BNA) 1690 (Sept. 13, 2016) (noting that investigations have focused on Subway,
McDonald's, Dunkin' Donuts, and "other national brands," with the Wage and Hour Division
having conducted nearly 4000 investigations at the twenty largest fast-food brands combined,
leading to discovery of more than 68,000 FLSA violations).
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address it.
2. Title VII
In a Title VII case, the D.C. Circuit seemed to endorse the
approach Browning-Ferris of California used by stressing the
significance of an employer's "retained" control.
We have recognized two largely overlapping articulations of the
test for identifying joint-employer status. ... The first ... speaks in
terms of the "'economic realities' of the work relationship,"
emphasizing whether the "employer has the right to control and
direct the work of an individual, not only as to the result to be
achieved, but also as to the details by which that result is achieved."
A second articulation borrows language from NLRB v. Browning-
Ferris Industries of Pennsylvania, 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982),
asking whether the employer, "while contracting in good faith with
an otherwise independent company, has retained for itself sufficient
control of the terms and conditions of employment of the
employees who are employed by the other employer."37
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit in Buler v. Drive
Automotive Industries of America, Inc., while holding as a matter of
first impression that joint employment doctrine may be used in Title
VII cases, focused "on determining which entities actually exercise
control."38 But even this case stressed that one reason to permit the
use of joint employment doctrine in Title VII cases is that the
doctrine will provide more protections to those employees who are
assigned by staffing agencies, where the user employer's reserved,
control will often be relevant.39
Notably, the EEOC has argued for the NLRB's Browning-Ferris
of California standard in employment discrimination cases. In
September 2016, it filed an amicus brief in the employer's appeal in
that NLRB case endorsing the NLRB's approach and stating that the
"NLRB acted appropriately in bringing its joint-employer standard in
line with the EEOC's."40
3. Wage and Hour Statutes
Courts and agencies are adopting broad definitions of joint
37. Al-Saffy v. Vilsack, 827 F.3d 85, 96-97 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting NLRB v. Browning-
Ferris Indus. of Pa., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
38. 793 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2015).
39. Id. at 410.
40. Matthew Bultman, EEOC Backs NLRB's Joint Employer Rule at DC Circ., LAW360
(Sept. 14, 2016, 9:09 PM), <https://www.1aw360.com/articles/840135/eeoc-backs-nlrb-s-joint-
employer-rule-at-dc-circ>.
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employment under other statutes as well. The Ninth Circuit has
explained that "the concept of joint employment should be defined
expansively under the FLSA," and joint employment may be found
where the facts show "that employment by one employer is not
completely dissociated from employment by the other employer."41
Along these lines, the Department of Labor Wage and Hour
Division under President Obama issued an Administrator's
Interpretation under which potential and/or indirect power to control
employment may lead to employer status. The interpretation
explained that the central concern is economic realities and
dependency, and it specified that:
To the extent that the potential joint employer has the power to
hire or fire the employee, modify employment conditions, or
determine the rate or method of pay, such control indicates that the
employee is economically dependent on the potential joint
employer. Again, the potential joint employer may exercise such
control indirectly and need not exclusively exercise such control for
there to be an indication of joint employment.42
While the Trump administration has withdrawn this interpretation,43
we believe it represents the correct approach.
Under President Obama, the Department of Labor seemed
interested in joint employment issues under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act" as well. Even before the NLRB issued Browning-
Ferris of California, the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration was exploring using the joint employer doctrine in
cases involving franchisors and franchisees.45  The Obama
administration's position included the following:
Host employers need to treat temporary workers as they treat
existing employees. Temporary staffing agencies and host
employers share control over the employee, and are therefore
jointly responsible for temp employee's safety and health. It is
essential that both employers comply with all relevant OSHA
requirements.
41. Chao v. A-One Med. Servs. Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 917 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Torres-
Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1997) and 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2002)).
42. Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Administrator's Interpretation No. 2016-1, at
12 (Jan. 20, 2016), <https://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/JointEmploymentAl.pdf>.
43. See Department of Labor News Release 17-0807-NAT (June 7, 2017), available
at <bttps://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/opalopa20l7O6O7>.
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2012).
45. Aaron Vehling, OSHA Mulls Joint Employer Standard for Safety Probes, LAw360
(Aug. 26, 2015, 4:12 PM), <https://www.law360.com/articles/695686/osha-mulls-joint-employer-
standard-for-safety-probes>.
46. Protecting Temporary Workers, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
<https://www.osha.gov/temp-workers/> (last visited May 6, 2017).
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Finally, in interpreting the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collections Act, the Third Circuit in Williams v. Jani-King of
Philadelphia, Inc. recently approved a class certification of workers,
despite the employer's argument that actual control was more
important than the "right to control."47 The opinion, which involved a
franchising relationship, stressed that Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had made the "right to control" the paramount consideration.4
In sum, while the Restatement does not address the relevance of
reserved or potential control in assessing joint employer status, a
growing consensus of courts and, at least until recently, federal
agencies is emerging. For reasons that follow, we add our voices to
this consensus.
E. Browning-Ferris of California is the Better Approach
Browning-Ferris of California represents the better approach.
This case was not a radical departure from past precedent. It did
reject limitations added to the joint employer concept from a few
cases decided in the 1980s.4'9 But the new rule is consistent with earlier
precedents, .e.g. Boire v. Greyhound Corp.,"' which the Restatement
uses as the basis for an illustration, and the Third Circuit's opinion in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Pennsylvania. Browning-Ferris of
California simply clarified that employers cannot avoid joint
employer status by retaining but not exercising "directly and
immediately" control over wages, hours, and working conditions.
Notably, in Browning-Ferris of California, Browning-Ferris, the
company that unsuccessfully argued it was not a joint employer,
controlled matters such as termination decisions indirectly, through
the supervisors of the other employer. The right to control terms and
conditions of employment is still required."
This approach is predicated on common law principles. As
Michael Harper, one of the Reporters for the Restatement has
47. 837 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2016).
48. Id. (citing Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 762 A.2d 328, 333
(Pa. 2000)).
49. TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984); Laerco Transp., 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984). Also,
Browning-Ferris upplants two later cases to the extent that they relied on the 1980s case: A&M
Property Holding Corp., 350 N.L.R.B. 998 (2007); Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 (2002).
50. 367 U.S. 473 (1964).
51. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Labor & Pensions, Comm. on
Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong. 45 (2015) (statement of Michael Harper, Prof. of Law,
Boston Univ. Sch. of Law).
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explained, the common law has long used the "right to control" test.5 2
Similarly, Professor Anne Lofaso has pointed out that this approach
is consistent with the both Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 2(1)
and the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(1), as both refer to a
"master" as one "who controls or has the right to control" the
conduct of someone performing services on the master's behalf.53 In
defending the position that the common law could find employer
status based on possessing power, as opposed to requiring that the
employer exercise that power, Professor Lofaso also cites Restatement
of the Law of Agency § 220, comment D: "the control or right of
control needed to establish the relation of master and servant may be
very attenuated."54
Indeed, Harper argues that "[t]he Illustrations in § 1.04,
Comment c, make clear that employer status turns on ultimate legal
authority or power, not on whether the power is exercised directly or
indirectly."" He notes that illustration 4 is based on the facts of
Greyhound v. Boire." Illustration 4 finds joint employment when the
employer at issue "has power to discipline, transfer, or promote. . . ."
While this illustration plausibly adopts the Browning-Ferris of
California test, and Professor Harper's explanation adds more force
to that interpretation, the Restatement could and should be more
explicit and clear on this point.
Further, a broad approach to joint employment is consistent with
the goals of employment law, especially in the context of a changing
economy. The Fourth Circuit explained this well in Butler v. Drive
Automotive Industries of America," a case decided before Browning
Ferris of California.
Finally, the joint employment doctrine also recognizes the reality of
changes in modern employment, in which increasing numbers of
workers are employed by temporary staffing companies that
exercise little control over their day-to-day activities. See Williams
v. Grimes Aerospace Co., 988 F. Supp. 925, 933-34
(D.S.C.1997) ("While the phenomenon of temporary employees
first gained momentum in the United States' post-World War II
economy, 'the temporary help industry has recently exploded,
52. Id. at 46-47, Harper also argues that Browning-Ferris of California did not hold that
"potential" control of working conditions alone was sufficient to find employer status. Id. at 46
n.3.
53. Id. at 60 (statement of Anne Marie Lofaso, Prof. of Law, W. Va. Univ. Coll. of Law).
54. Id. at 61.
55. Id. at 47.
56. Id.
57. 793 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2015).
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especially since the 1980s."' (brackets omitted)
(quoting Development in the Law-Employment Discrimination: V.
Temporary Employment and the Imbalance of Power, 109 Harv. L.
Rev. 1647, 1648 (1996))); Lima v. Addeco, 634 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The joint employer doctrine has been applied to
temporary employment or staffing agencies and their client
entities."). -
The joint employment doctrine thus prevents those who effectively
employ a worker from evading liability by hiding behind another
entity, such as a staffing agency. Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488
F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Given Title VII's remedial intent,
employers should not be able to "avoid Title VII by affixing a label
to a person that does not capture the substance of the employment
relationship." Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 207 F.3d
480, 484 (8th Cir. 2000)."
Significantly, in this case, the Fourth Circuit explained that one
of the most important factors in determining joint employment was
whether or not the purported employers "have the power to hire and
fire."" It did not require that the power be direct or regularly
exercised. This is the better approach.
Allowing indirect or potential control to create an employment
relationship could have important, positive effects for workers.
Professor Matthew Finkin gives an example involving farmworkers
growing produce which Campbell Soup ultimately uses, and how the
test endorsed above could at least arguably lead to that employer's
joint responsibility for wage and hour violations.? While the
farmworkers work in the fields, not a Campbell plant, and while
Campbell's supervisors do not directly monitor them, "they cannot be
shifted by their growers to non-Campbell work; their work is integral
to Campbell's production; their growers' contracts cannot be shifted
to another...; and their work is not only predominantly but
exclusively done for Campbell."6 1 In such a situation, we believe, joint
responsibility is appropriate.
58. Id. at 410. David Weil implied a similar dynamic with respect to franchises: "When
running their own facilities, major fast-food companies are quite scrupulous in terms of
compliance.... But why [do franchisors] tolerate in franchisees what they deplore in their own
operations?" WEIL, supra note 2, at 196.
59. 793 F.3d at 414.





The test for when an unpaid internship is legal because the intern
is not an "employee" is also a high-profile, controversial issue in the
modem economy.2 The use of unpaid internships has skyrocketed in
recent years.63 One study found that in 2014, 68.4 percent of 2014 high
school graduates were enrolled in colleges; about 61 percent of
college students by their senior year had participated in an internship;
and nearly half of those interns did not receive any pay or
compensation for their work.6 Another study shows that 75 percent
of four-year college students will hold at least one internship before
graduating and that one-third to one-half of those internships will be
without compensation. Yet another study found that paid interns
were twice as likely as unpaid interns to receive a job offer from the
company where they worked and that unpaid internships were less
likely than paid internships to lead to well-paying jobs.i
The law governing this topic remains unclear. While, as discussed
below, the Department of Labor has issued guidance in this area for
purposes of the FLSA, some courts have been skeptical about
adopting the rule in this guidance. The result is a multiplicity of tests.67
We believe that the Restatement should have recommended the
Department of Labor's approach for the FLSA. First, litigation over
unpaid internships usually arises under the FLSA or statutes with
similar goals of protecting employees. Second, we believe the
62. Misclassification of student interns was recently the subject of an article in the parody
news site The Onion, underscoring popular awareness of this issue. College Senior Holding Out
Hope that Internship Will Lead to Class-Action Lawsuit, THE ONION (Jan. 9, 2017), <http://
www.theonion.com/article/college-senior-holding-out-hope-internship-will-le-54994>.
63. The Department of Labor does not track the number of unpaid internships, but one
estimate in 2012 put the number of unpaid interns each year as ranging from 500,000 to one
million. Derek Thompson, Work Is Work: Why Free Internships Are Immoral, ATLANTIC (May
14, 2012), <http://www.theatlantic.com/businesslarchive/2012/05/work-iswork-why-free-intern
ships-are-immoral/257130/>.
64. Sean Hughes & Jerry Lagomarsine, Note, The Misfortune of the Unpaid Intern, 32
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 409, 409-10 (2015).
65. Nina Markey et al., Get Your Own Coffee: Advice for Employers Facing Increasing
Uncertainty with Respect o the FLSA and Unpaid Internships, 33 HoFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
101, 101-02 (2016).
66. Thomas Johnson, The Fox Searchlight Signal Why Fox Searchlight Marks the
Beginning of the End for Preferential Treatment of Unpaid Internships at Nonprofits, 102 VA. L.
REv. 1127, 1159 (2016).
67. For a good discussion of this issue in general, including but not limited to the various
and often conflicting tests and approaches different courts have used in these cases, see David
Yamada, The Legal and Social Movement Against Unpaid Internships, 8 NE. U. L.J. 357 (2016).
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Department of Labor's approach to this issue is the soundest,
providing both the most clarity and the most protection to employees
in the modern economy.
B. Problems With the Restatement's Approach to the Topic
Restatement section 1.02 comment g addresses unpaid interns,
but it does not adequately deal with this issue as it exists today. The
first sentence of the discussion is arguably misleading, and its
remaining discussion seems mostly aimed at internships provided by
educational institutions themselves to students. Specifically, comment
g provides:
g. Interns and student assistants. Interns who provide services
without compensation or a clear promise of future employment
generally are not employees for purposes of this Restatement.
Similarly, students who render uncompensated services to satisfy
education or training requirements for graduation or for admission
into a particular profession or craft generally are not employees.
These are corollaries of the principle that an individual's unilateral
expectation of future opportunities is not sufficient to establish
employee status. An individual remains a volunteer even if she
renders uncompensated service as part of her training or education
with the hope of obtaining a job with a particular employer rather
than to develop skills that would be useful to many employers.
Where an educational institution compensates tudent assistants for
performing services that benefit the institution, however, such
compensation encourages the students to do the work for more
than educational benefits and thereb' establishes an employment
as well as an educational relationship.
The first sentence in isolation could be read to mean that if a
worker deemed an "intern" is performing services for an employer
without being paid and the worker has no "clear promise of future
employment," that worker is not an employee. Nowhere in this
section of the Restatement is the term "intern" defined. Nor is the
phrase "clear promise of future employment" defined. Under
employment-at-will rules and common hiring and employment
practices, many workers who are unambiguously employees have no
"clear promise of future employment." It cannot be true, however,
that merely labelling a worker an "intern," refusing to give that
worker a clear promise of future employment, and not paying the
worker makes the worker a "volunteer" and not an "employee." That
certainly is not true under labor and employment law statutes.
68. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.02 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
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The remainder of the text of comment g seems to deal with
educational institutions that provide different types of internships to
students at the educational institution or pursuant to degree
requirements of the institution. Indeed, the Restatement's two
illustrations on this issue involve such fact patterns. Notably, both
illustrations were drawn from cases decided under an employment
law statute, Title VII."
10. A is a graduate student in biochemistry at university P. In order
to complete the degree requirements, A must work in a laboratory
under P's auspices, either for pay or as a volunteer. A works in the
laboratory of a professor, for which A is paid a yearly stipend and
given full tuition remission. The professor has secured grants to
support the research that A is assisting. A is an employee of P. P is
providing A with significant benefits both in order to further A's
education and also to obtain A's services on P's funded research."
11. A is a social-work student at a university. In order to obtain a
degree, A must complete an internship as a volunteer at a
university-approved social-service agency. A elects to work at P, a
hospital for the mentally disabled. P does not provide pay or other
benefits to A. A is not an employee of P."
In illustration 10, it is not entirely clear what makes the worker
an employee. Is it that the employer has decided to pay the worker,
or is it that the employer, as well as the employee, is receiving
significant benefits from the work? The former reading cannot be
sufficient, as this implies, again, that simply deciding not to pay a
worker goes at least a long way in legally justifying not paying the
worker. The latter reading is similar to the "primary beneficiary" test
some courts have used under the FLSA. This test is discussed further,
and critiqued, below. Illustration 11 makes the point that an
internship that is a necessary component of an educational degree
may be unpaid, without explaining why that is true.
C. Students Working at Educational Institutions They Attend
The reporters' note includes further discussion of cases involving
students and their own schools. It cites cases on the issue of whether
student athletes receiving athletic scholarships who were injured
while playing a money-generating sport are entitled to receive
69. The reporters' note on this issue explains that illustration 10 is based on Cuddeback v.
Florida Board of Education, 381 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2004) and illustration 11 is based on
O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997), both Title VII cases.
70. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW §1.02 cmt. g, illus. 10.
71. Id. illus 11.
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workers-compensation benefits.72 Here, the note might have fruitfully
engaged with, or at least noted, the arguments found in the NLRB's
Regional Director's decision in the Northwestern University case
involving football players." In short, in that case the Regional
Director found that the college football players at Northwestern were
not primarily students: their football activities were not integral to
their education; academic faculty did not supervise their activities as
part of a degree program; the football program produced a
tremendous amount of revenue; and the school exercised a great deal
of control over the lives of the athletes both on and off the field.
While the full NLRB declined to take jurisdiction in this case,74 and
no court has found college athletes to be employees, this issue is
likely to come up again, perhaps under the NLRA and perhaps under
other statutes." We are sympathetic to the position of the NLRIB
Regional Director in that case, and we believe that the Restatement's
short discussion of old cases on this issue will not do the topic justice
moving forward.
The reporters' note also mentions the NLRB's shifting positions
as to when, if ever, graduate and research assistants at universities
should be considered "employees." It is worth mentioning, that
NLRB has recently reversed the most recent case on this issue,
Brown University76 (which, as the note explains, held that such
assistants were not employees).77 In Trustees of Columbia University
in the City of New York7 1 the NLRB reverted to an earlier rule (also
from a case involving NYU7 ) under which paid graduate assistants
often would be considered to be employees. Notably, in Trustees of
Columbia University, the NLRB stressed that it was using common-
law principles in its analysis.
72. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.02 cmt. g, reporters' note (majority approach: no).
73. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n (CAPA), 198 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1837 (NLRB
Reg'1 Dir. 2014).
74. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17,2015).
75. See, e.g., Lester Munson, Free to Tweet: Northwestern's Restrictions on Football Players
Ruled Unlawful, ESPN (Oct. 10, 2016), <http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story//id/17765516/nrb-
rules-northwestern-restrictions-unlawful> (discussing an NLRB case where Northwestern
University agreed to modify its social media policy for football players).
76. 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
77. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.02 cmt. g, reporters' note. The NLRB invited briefs
in two cases involving NYU. Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, N.Y. Univ., No. 2-RC-23481
(NLRB June 22, 2012); Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, Polytechnic Inst. of N.Y. Univ., No.
29-RC-012054 (NLRB June 22,2012).
78. 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016).
79. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
80. 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 6.
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Further, given that many universities are public institutions, it
would be wise to consider public-sector labor law rules as well as rules
under the NLRA. In short, in the public sector, rules vary under
differing state laws, with some more inclusive than others."' As a
generalization, though, rules in the public sector are often more
inclusive in treating graduate assistants as employees.2
We believe the more inclusive approach is better. Specifically,
for both the public and private sectors, we believe that graduate
assistants who work as teachers or researchers, even if the teaching or
researching is in a field they may wish to teach or practice in later,
should be treated as employees if they meet the test of the NLRB in
the first New York University case,D reinstated in Trustees of
Columbia University. In the first New York University case, the Board
relied on Boston Medical Center," which had held that various
interns, residents, and fellows in medical schools, who had completed
their medical degrees but were enrolled in a hospital's on-the-job
training program that provided education and experience needed for
a medical license and specialty certifications, were employees." The
Board held that NYU's graduate assistants were analogous to the
employees in Boston Medical Center and, applying the common-law
test which governs coverage determinations under NLRA section
2(3), held that the graduate assistants were "employees."" We believe
this is the correct approach.
81. See generally MARTIN MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 528-35 (3d ed. 2016); Grant Hayden, The University Works Because We Do:
Collective Bargaining Rights for Graduate Assistants, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233 (2001).
82. Illinois is an example of a less inclusive rule, under which students whose assistantships
are "significantly connected to their status as students" are not covered. Graduate Emps. Org. v.
Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 733 N.E.2d 759 (Ill. App. 2000). That is a minority approach,
however. For an example of the more common approach, see In the Matter of the Employees of
Temple University, 32 PPER $l 32164 (Pa. Labor Relations Bd. 2001), which held that graduate
assistants were covered employees. In finding graduate assistants covered under Pennsylvania
law, Temple University noted that Graduate Employees' Organization represented a
small minority rule, and it cited numerous public-sector precedents holding that graduate
assistants were covered. According to the AFL-CIO's brief filed in Brown University,
bargaining relationships had been established between graduate assistants and the University of
California, the University of Florida, the University of South Florida, the University of Iowa,
the University of Kansas, the University of Massachusetts, Michigan State University, the
University of Michigan, Rutgers, the City University of New York, New York University, the
State University of New York, the University of Oregon, Temple University, the University of
Wisconsin, and Wayne State University. Brief for AFL-CIO as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, at 36, Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
83. 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
84. 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 153 (1999).
85. 332 N.L.R.B. at 1206.
86. Id.
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D. Students Working for Other Employers
The issue of unpaid interns in the modern economy, however,
goes far beyond students performing work for the education
institutions the students attend. Recent cases have focused on interns
at for-profit institutions and internships that are not required
components of educational degrees." The reporters' note addresses
this issue as follows:
Many students do not meet the initial conditions for being
employees because their work serves only their own interest in
learning and skill development rather than the interest of the
institution providing the instruction or training. This can be true
even for a for-profit enterprise providing practical training as a
means of developing a labor pool for future recruitment. See the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the FLSA in Walling v. Portland
Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947), where the railroad's training
brakemen were found to receive "no immediate advantage" from
any work done by the trainees. Id. at 153."
Yet after citing Walling v. Portland, the note goes on to treat the
FLSA rule as distinct from the common law rule.
Particular legislation may provide for a different treatment of
volunteers than the common-law rule stated in this Section. For
example, the FLSA broadly defines the term "employ" to include
"to suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). In Walling v.
Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152-153 (1947), the Court held
this language did not encompass a private railroad company's
training program because the trainees worked "for their own
advantage" and "the railroads receive[d] no immediate advantage"
from that work."
We believe it is best to use one rule in this area and not
distinguish between a "common law" rule and "statutory" rules. As
noted infra, the NLRB already purports to use the common law test
for NLRA cases, and the Restatement takes for its own illustrations
two Title VII cases. The bulk of the litigation about whether interns
are employees has been under the FLSA, and we will focus on that
litigation in discussing what we believe is the best rule.
The reporters' note describes the interpretation and test from the
Department of Labor on this issue," while noting that "[s]everal
87. The focus below is on interns at for-profit employers. Both courts and the Department
of Labor have not been entirely clear as to whether the same rules do or should apply to interns
at non-profits. See Johnson, supra note 66 (arguing that the same rules do and should apply to
both sectors).
88. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW 1.02 Reporter's Note.
89. Id.
90. Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), WH-20, 1970 WL 26388 (Mar. 31,
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federal courts have resisted this interpretation of Walling, instead
applying a test turning on whether the trainee or the putative
employer is the primary beneficiary of the training."9' It is true that
courts have been split on the test to use in these cases,9 but we
believe the Department of Labor's test is best, and that the
Restatement should have endorsed it.
The Department of Labor's test states that for an unpaid
internship to be legal under the FLSA, all of the following criteria
must be met.
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be
given in an educational environment;
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under
close supervision of existing staff;
4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate
advantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its
operations may actually be impeded;
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of
the internship; and
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.9'
While some courts use variations on this test in which not every
factor must be met,94 the main competing approach is the "primary
1970).
91. The note gives the following citations: See, e.g., Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium &
Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011); Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005);
McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989). But cf. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight
Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 530-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (declining to apply the primary-
beneficiary test to motion-picture production interns). More recently, however, the Second
Circuit took a different approach in the Glatt litigation. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.,
811 F.3d 528, 536-37 (2d Cir. 2015) (adopting a multi-factor, balancing approach to determine
who is the primary beneficiary). Other courts have used a multi-factor "totality of the
circumstances" test. See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993);
Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1982).
92. See, e.g., Yamada, supra note 67.
93. WAGE & HOUR Div., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FAcr SHEET # 71, INTERNSHIP
PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr (April 2010), available at <http://www.
dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs7l.pdf>.
94. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536 (citing with approval Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp.,
537 F.3d 132, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2008) that "employment" is "a flexible concept to be determined
on a case-by-case basis by review of the totality of the circumstances" and applying a "set of
non-exhaustive factors") See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1210 n.9
(11th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). Schumann itself used a "non-exhaustive set of
considerations" to use in determining who the "primary beneficiary" of an internship was,
listing seven such considerations which overlap with, but differ in part, from the Department of
Labor's list. Id. at 1211-12. Thus, while rejecting the Department of Labor's approach, the Glatt
court also rejected the stricter "primary beneficiary" test used by the district court in Schumann.
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beneficiary" test, in which courts attempt to determine, for any given
internship, whether the worker or the employer is the "primary
beneficiary" of the intern relationship. The many different tests
courts have used have led to calls for a single, standardized
approach.5
We believe the Department of Labor's approach is superior for
two reasons. First, the "primary beneficiary" test is too difficult to
apply in practice. Presumably, most internships benefit both sides in
ways that are hard if not impossible to directly weigh or compare.
Also, a worker providing benefits to an employer should not be
deprived of "employee" status merely because the worker is receiving
some valuable experience by doing the work.
Second, practically, the Department of Labor test will be more
difficult to meet. We believe, as a matter of policy, that it is preferable
that unpaid internships at for-profit employers be relatively rare.
They are a source of potential exploitation of workers by institutions
that typically could easily be providing payment in exchange for
useful labor. They make it more difficult for less well-off workers to
enter certain fields and job categories by excluding those who cannot
afford to spend significant time working for no compensation. A
number of scholars and articles have criticized the "primary
beneficiary" test for not providing sufficient protections for workers.9
Also, there is increasing evidence that unpaid internships do not
provide the purported benefits the interns believe they will receive.
Often, unpaid interns are assigned menial tasks and are not later
considered for regular, full time work." Widespread use of unpaid
internships may also displace paid, experienced workers. And again,
because they are unpaid, such internships are generally limited to
those who can afford to work for a significant period of time without
wages, thus disadvantaging those from less affluent backgrounds.98
95. Hughes & Lagomarsine, supra note 64; Nicole Klingler, Note, Will Work for Free: The
Legality of Unpaid Internships, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 551 (2016); Madiha Malik,
Note, The Legal Void of Unpaid Internships: Navigating the Legality of Internships in the Face of
Conflicting Tests Interpreting the FLSA, 47 CONN. L. REv. 1183 (2015).
96. See, e.g., Hughes & Lagomarsine, supra note 64 (arguing for the rule the lower court
used in Glatt); Klingler, supra note 95 (primary benefits test he Second Circuit used in Glatt
does not adequately protect unpaid interns, nor does it inform employers of the standards they
need to meet in order to adopt legal unpaid internship programs).
97. Malik, supra note 95, at 1188.
98. Id. at 1188-89 (citing KATHRYN ANNE EDWARDS & ALEXANDER HERTEL-
FERNANDEZ, ECON. POL'Y INST., POLICY MEMORANDUM #160, NOT-SO-EQUAL PROTECTION:
REFORMING THE REGULATION OF STUDENT INTERNSHIPS 3 (2010), <http://www.epi.org/files/
page/-/pdf/epi-pm_160.pdf> (choice to take an unpaid internship depends on a student's
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We are sympathetic to the arguments made by Professor David
Yamada. He writes:
The unwieldy "primary beneficiary" test adopted by the court of
appeals in Glatt gives the label of intern an unwarranted legal
meaning and distracts us from the fundamental concept of paying
people for work rendered. By simply pasting "intern" on what
otherwise might be considered a part-time, summer, or
postgraduate entry-level job, an employer now can take its chances
and make the position unpaid, claiming that the training,
experience, and networking opportunities provided to the intern
exceed the benefits provided to the employer by the intern's labor.
The intern, in turn, is left in the unenviable position of either
accepting what are likely to be unilaterally imposed terms or
challenging the unpaid status and thus jeopardizing her future
career.
Also, as Professor Yamada explains, the "primary beneficiary"
test is ill-conceived and difficult if not impossible to apply. It
underestimates the "significant benefits of internships to two major
stakeholders, employers and institutions of higher education.""O First,
employers reap many benefits from interns, by allowing them to train
and evaluate prospective employees as well as getting work done.
Second, educational institutions benefit from incorporating
internships into degree programs, increasing the marketability of such
programs and allowing the educational institution to charge tuition
for time spent in internships'1 As to application, Professor Yamada,
citing the District Court in Glatt, argues that "the primary beneficiary
test has an inherently illogical and unpredictable dynamic to it."' 2
The same internship could be compensable for one intern if that
intern gained little from it, but not compensable to another who did
the same work but learned a lot. "Under this test, an employer could
never know in advance whether it would be required to pay its
interns.""
Allowing internships to be unpaid only in relatively narrow
circumstances would also help curb abuse in this area. Significant
evidence exists that employers are taking advantage of relatively tight
labor markets in some fields to create internships that are illegal
under any existing approach, simply because the interns involved are
"economic means, thus institutionalizing socioeconomic disparities beyond college")).
99. Yamada, supra note 67, at 372.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 373.
103. Id.
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too intimidated to sue, because they do not want to be practically
blackballed from certain industries."" A variety of academics have
argued that "unpaid interns displace paid labor, hurt the economy,
and receive few opportunities to develop substantive experience."'
In close cases, the Restatement should have adopted a position that
protects more vulnerable workers at the margins. We believe the
Department of Labor rule is the correct approach, and that the
Restatement should have indicated that.
IV. MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE APP-BASED ECONOMY?
Seven years ago, the working group on the proposed Restatement
(Third) of Employment Law urged that technological change would
prompt "important changes in ... normative expectations" regarding
employment status."' Sure enough, as the Restatement was being
finalized and going to print, familiar questions about the distinction
between independent contractors and employees were beginning to
arise in a new context: the "app-based economy." Whether at least
some app-based workers are employees - rather than independent
contractors, as their putative employers often claim - is a question
currently being litigated in numerous courts and administrative fora,
as well as in the court of public opinion."' We anticipate that, when
the dust settles, many app-based economy workers will be re-
classified as employees; for example, our own view is that at
minimum, a core group of Uber drivers who drive a significant
amount of time and meaningfully rely on Uber for income are
currently misclassified as independent contractors for purposes of
many state and federal aws.
In the meantime, this Part offers a preview of things to come by
surveying pending litigation regarding the classification of app-based
workers in light of the common law principles articulated in the
Restatement. We believe that, while the Restatement offers analysis
and examples of the distinction between independent contractors and
104. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2010), <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03intern.html>.
105. Johnson, supra note 66, at 1160 (collecting sources).
106. Working Group, supra note 1, at 84.
107. AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SHARED, COLLABORATIVE AND ON DEMAND:
THE NEW DIGITAL ECONOMY 8 (2016), <http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2016/05/PI 2016.
05.19_Sharing-EconomyFINAL.pdf> (survey finding that 66 percent of respondents indicated
that they considered workers in ride-hailing services like Uber and Lyft to be independent
contractors).
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employees, it missed an opportunity to articulate the purpose of this
distinction in various contexts. As a result, it will be of less use to
decision-makers in future cases than it otherwise could have been. A
more focused analysis of this threshold issue would have made
decision makers' tasks easier by contextualizing the various factors
that go into the employee/independent contractor analysis, while also
promoting just outcomes in these cases. Thus, rather than advocating
for a particular rule, this Part advocates for a purposive approach to
applying the various multi-factor employee/independent contractor
tests.
A. Background: The App-Based Economy
We use the phrase "app-based economy" to refer to economic
transactions that are facilitated by online applications that match
customers with providers, such as when a rider uses the Uber app to
be matched with a driver, or a traveler uses AirBnB to find a place to
stay.'" While the ride-hailing apps Uber and Lyft are likely the most
familiar examples, others abound: for example, the app Handy allows
users to request workers to perform cleaning, home repair, and
similar tasks; the app Postmates dispatches runners to deliver
customers' take-out food orders; and on the more exclusive end, the
now-defunct app FlyteNow could be described as Uber for private
jets. These services are growing rapidly as developers seek new jobs
to which the app-based model might be brought to bear; thus, while
the app "Pooper" " - Uber for dog poop - turned out to be a hoax, its
launch was covered by news outlets including the Washington Post,"o
and "hundreds" of people reportedly signed up either to have their
dog's waste picked up by a stranger for a fee, or to work as
"scoopers.",,m
108. Other terms commonly used to refer to these businesses include "sharing economy,"
"gig economy," "on-demand economy," and "1099 economy." We have chosen to use the
phrase app-based economy because, in our view, it most accurately describes the subset of work
arrangements discussed in this Part. However, when another source uses a different term, we
use that term, and acknowledge that different terms can encompass somewhat different sets of
transactions.
109. POOPER, <http://pooperapp.com/> (last visited May 6, 2017).
110. Karin Brulliard, Update: Sorry, Lazy Dog Owners. The App that Finds Someone to
Scoop Poop Is Fake, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2016), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/anim
alialwp/2016/07/22/so-it-has-come-to-this-an-app-that-finds-someone-to-pick-up-your-dogs-po
op/>.
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As the foregoing suggests, app-based transactions are
increasingly common; one study found that "72 percent of American
adults have used at least one of 11 different shared and on-demand
services," and 15 percent of Americans have used a ride-hailing app.11
And, while the size of the app-based economy workforce is very
difficult to determine, a recent estimate suggested that at least
"600,000 workers, or 0.4 percent of total U.S. employment, work with
an online intermediary in the gig economy," with two thirds of those
working for Uber."3 However, the same study noted that participation
in gig economy work could actually be twice as large,H4 and another
survey predicted that "on-demand economy" participation was much
larger still; it claimed that nearly a quarter of Americans have offered
an "on-demand" service at least once."5 The difficulty of estimating
the extent of Americans' participation in the app-based economy is
illustrated by the Internal Revenue Service's response to a question
from Senator Mark Warner regarding the size of the on-demand
economy; after detailing various challenges in quantifying the extent
of that participation based on information that the IRS collects, that
agency essentially threw up its hands, refusing to hazard even an
116
estimate.
The classification of workers is often challenging, as the
application of multifactor tests tends to be. And the early experience
of courts and agencies suggests that the classification of workers in
the app-based economy is a particularly difficult iteration of this task.
This is in part because the technology involved - the apps that define
this sector of the economy - obscures and complicates the
112. SMITH, supra note 107, at 3, 5. However, that statistic captures many types of online
transactions that do not generally raise questions about worker classification (for example, using
the websites Etsy or eBay to purchase second-hand goods).
113. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KREUGER, THE HAMILTON PROJECr, DISCUSSION
PAPER 2015-10, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY
WORK: THE "INDEPENDENT WORKER" 2, 12 (2015), <http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/
files/modernizing-labor_1aws-for twenty-first century-work-krueger-harris.pdf>.
114. Id. at 12.
115. A poll conducted by Time Magazine, the public relations firm Burson Marsteller, and
the Aspen Institute reached the conclusion that "22% of American adults, or 45 million people,
have already offered some kind of good or service in [the on demand] economy." Katy
Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME (Jan. 6, 2016), <http://
time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/>. That same survey concluded that 10 percent of
Americans have offered ride-sharing services, and 11 percent of Americans have offered
services via "platforms that connect people looking for services like a handyman, babysitter,
care provider or mover." Burson-Marsteller et al., The On-Demand Economy Survey (2016)
(powerpoint presentation on file with author).
116. Letter from Anne Wall, Assistant Sec'y for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury to Senator Mark R. Warner (Oct. 27, 2015), 2015 WL 7356208.
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relationship between workers and the enterprises they serve.
For example, the "right to control" test discussed in the
Restatement looks to, among other things, "whether or not the one
employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business.""' In
traditional cases, this factor is often relatively easily resolved in one
direction or the other - even where the employee/independent
contractor inquiry is otherwise a close one. For example, in one
instance of the long-running litigation over whether certain FedEx
drivers were employees or independent contractors, the Ninth Circuit
easily dispatched this factor in favor of the plaintiffs;"' even FedEx
itself acknowledged that both it and the plaintiff drivers were
involved in the "pickup and delivery of packages," though it made a
passing attempt to argue that it was involved primarily in the
"information and distribution network for the pickup and delivery of
packages," whereas the drivers were involved in the "physical pickup
and delivery of packages.""' But even that level of agreement is often
lacking in the app-based economy cases. Instead, fundamental
disagreements exist as to what business app-based companies like
Uber are in. Specifically, Uber steadfastly maintains that it is a
technology company - in the business of creating and marketing a
platform that could be used to facilitate many different types of
transactions - whereas Uber drivers are in the transportation
business.120 (In this regard, Uber can point to its expansion into food
delivery via "UberEATS," and the on-demand elivery of adoptable
kittens via "UberKITTENS." 21) On the other hand, Uber drivers who
have brought misclassification suits have argued that they both they
and Uber are in the transportation business.m Which characterization
117. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.01 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
118. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 2014)
(reasoning that "'the work performed by the drivers is wholly integrated into FedEx's
operation. The drivers look like FedEx employees, act like FedEx employees, [and] are paid
like FedEx employees ... The customers are FedEx's customers, not the drivers' customers,"'
quoting Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct. App. 2007)).
119. Second Brief on Cross-Appeal at 61, Alexander, 765 F.3d at 981 (Nos. 12-17509, 12-
17458), 2013 WL 3171021 (also arguing that some contractors may be incorporated).
120. E.g., O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ("In
this litigation, Uber bills itself as a 'technology company,' not a 'transportation company,' and
describes the software it provides as a 'lead generation platform' that can be used to connect
'businesses that provide transportation' with passengers who desire rides. Uber notes that it
owns no vehicles, and contends that it employs no drivers. Rather, Uber partners with alleged
independent contractors that it frequently refers to as 'transportation providers."')
121. See UBEREATS, <https://ubereats.com/> (last visited May 7, 2017); Sarah Haydu,
Clear your Calendars - #UberKITTENS Are Back, UBER (Oct. 28, 2015), <https://newsroom.
uber.com/uberkittens-are-back/>.
122. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 ("Plaintiffs characterize Uber's business (and their
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of Uber one accepts will in turn influence whether one views Uber
drivers as employees.
The app-based economy presents similar challenges in assessing
the extent to which the employer "controls the manner and means by
which the individual renders the services."123 As the Restatement puts
it:
the employer's power to control the manner and means by which
an individual renders services is sufficient to make the service
provider an employee. Where the employer exercises such power,
the service provider generally cannot further his or her economic
interest by exercising entrepreneurial authority with respect to the
scheduling of performance.. 124
Yet, in much of the app-based economy, the putative employer's
power to control the manner and means of service delivery is at least
partially devolved onto a combination of service providers themselves
and the providers' customers. Again, Uber illustrates why this is.
First, as Professor Miriam Cherry has written, "[r]ather than .. . spot
checks by supervisors, Uber has essentially outsourced its quali-
ty control to its passengers."12 It does this by asking passengers to
rate drivers on a scale of 1-5 at the conclusion of a ride, and
deactivating (which is to say, terminating) drivers whose star rating
falls below a certain cut-off point.'26 Because Uber can set the
required minimum star rating at a very high threshold - for example,
an internal Uber document revealed that San Francisco drivers whose
average rating fell below 4.6 were at risk of deactivation'27 - drivers
will have a strong incentive to hew to local norms governing Uber
rides.2 In addition, Uber can discipline drivers short of deactivating
relationship with Uber) differently. They note that while Uber now disclaims that it is a
'transportation company,' Uber has previously referred to itself as an 'On-Demand Car
Service', and goes by the tagline 'Everyone's Private Driver."')
123. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.01 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
124. Id.
125. Miriam Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 577, 597 (2016); see also Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic
Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber's Drivers, 10 INT'L J. COMM. 3758
(2016) (describing Uber's use of surveillant practices to effect "soft control" over otherwise
flexible workers).
126. Legal: Uber Community Guidelines, UBER (last updated Apr. 6, 2017), <https://
www.uber.com/legal/community-guidelines/us-en/> (scroll down to "Why Drivers Can Lose
Access to Uber - US Only") (stating that "[t]here are several ways we measure driver quality,
with the most important being Star Ratings and Cancellation Rate").
127. James Cook, Uber's Internal Charts Show How its Driver-Rating System Actually
Works, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 11, 2015, 11:53 AM), <http://www.businessinsider.com/leaked-
charts-show-how-ubers-driver-rating-system-works-2015-2>.
128. For example, Uber driver online forums include threads on which drivers discuss
whether and how they provide "extras" - water, candy, magazines, or phone chargers - for
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them by temporarily blocking access to the accountl29-that is,
suspending them. Uber uses this technique to encourage drivers who
are logged into the Uber app to accept trip requests because, as Uber
puts it, "[c]onsistently accepting trip requests ... keeps the system
running smoothly."'" Thus, Uber expects drivers to routinely accept
rides when they are logged in and has developed mechanisms to
enforce that expectation.
But at the same time, drivers own their own cars, and they are
not required to log in at any particular times or drive in any particular
places. That is, unlike in other driver classification cases,13' there are
neither Uber shifts nor pre-determined Uber routes, although the
Uber app includes mapping software that suggests the most efficient
route for drivers to take once they have picked up a passenger.
Instead, Uber has so far attempted to motivate drivers to drive at
peak times by offering "surge pricing,"132 as well as through messages,
delivered through the Uber app, that encourage drivers to start or
keep driving.'33 When surge pricing is in effect, drivers benefit from
increased per-trip earnings; at any time, drivers can increase their
fares per hour by successfully predicting where and when passengers
are likely to need rides. Finally, the Uber driver agreement refers to
the possibility that drivers may charge passengers a lower fare than
the one designated by Uber,'" though it is unclear how drivers would
passengers' use. See, e.g., Water, Candy, Phone Chargers?, UBERPEOPLE (discussion started by
Jeeves July 6, 2014), <http://uberpeople.net/threads/water-candy-phone-chargers.803/>. Those
threads suggest that at least some Uber drivers are concerned with what we might call area
standards in the sense they want to provide service that is on par with other drivers in order to
ensure a high rating from passengers, but also to avoid spending unnecessarily on items to
enhance passengers' experiences.
129. Legal: Uber Community Guidelines, supra note 126 (scroll down to "Why Drivers Can
Lose Access to Uber - US Only").
130. Legal: Uber Community Guidelines, supra note 126 (scroll down to "Acceptance
Rates").
131. E.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (describing
management system in which particular drivers were responsible for completing one or more
delivery routes in context of assessing whether drivers had opportunity for entrepreneurial
control); Yellow Cab Coop., Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434, 436 (Ct.
App. 1991) (cab drivers would "lease" cabs for ten-hour shifts, during which drivers were free to
work however they saw fit).
132. Aarti Shahani, Uber Plans to Kill Surge Pricing, Though Drivers Say it Makes Job
Worth It, NPR (May 3, 2016, 4:36 AM) <http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/05/
03/476513775/uber-plans-to-kill-surge-pricing-though-drivers-say-it-makes-job-worth-it>.
133. Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers' Buttons, NY
TIMES (APRIL 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-drive
rs-psychological-tricks.html.
134. Raiser, LLC, Software License and Online Services Agreement para 4.1 (last updated
Nov. 10, 2014), <https://uber-regulatory-documents.s3.amazonaws.com/country/united-states/p
2p/Partner%20Agreement%20November%2010%202014.pdf> (stating that drivers "shall
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actually do this; passengers enter their credit card information into
the Uber app and are charged automatically, with no apparent
opportunity for drivers to lower the fare.'35 Instead, drivers wanting to
lower fares (for example, in order to avoid a low star rating due to an
obstructed route) more commonly simply end the trip in the Uber
app before they have arrived at the passenger's destination, and
provide the rest of the ride for free.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, it is difficult to identify
characteristics of the "typical" worker in the app-based economy.
Apps like Uber tout their flexibility and emphasize that workers may
work as much or as little as they like, switching between apps at will -
presumably to bolster arguments that they should be free of the
constraints of the employment relationship as well as other forms of
regulation.'" Still, while Uber reports that "[m]ore than half" of its
drivers "work nine hours or less per week," 37 Professor Noah Zatz
has argued that "a small proportion of drivers are doing most of
Uber's work."3'" As the Restatement reflects, some iterations of the
modern employee vs. independent contractor analysis explicitly
consider a workers' reliance on a particular putative employer;'39
courts and agencies applying these standards to Uber drivers may
accordingly find that some drivers are more likely to be employees
than others.'
always have the right to ... charge a fare that is less than the pre-arranged Fare").
135. See Spencer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 822 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (stating that
Uber CEO Travis Kalanick "contends that Uber's Driver Terms 'do provide that driver-
partners have the discretion to charge less than the suggested price determined by Uber's
pricing algorithm,"' but that "Plaintiffs point out . . . 'there is no mechanism by which drivers
can charge anything but the App-dictated fare."').
136. Kia Kokalitcheva, Uber CEO: Most Drivers Work Too Little to be Considered Full
Time Employees, FORTUNE (Oct. 21, 2015), <http://fortune.com/2015/10/21/travis-kalanick-part-
time-drivers/>.
137. Id.
138. Noah Zatz, Is Uber Wagging the Dog With Its Moonlighting Drivers?, ON LABOR (Feb.
1, 2016), <https://oniabor.org/2016/02/01/is-uber-wagging-the-dog-with-its-moonlighting-drive
rs/>.
139. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.01 cmts. d-e, reporters' note (discussing the
"economic realities" test and stating that "[a]s applied in modern FLSA decisions," relevant
considerations include "the permanence of the working relationship"; quoting Baker v. Flint
Eng'g & Constr. Corp., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1989)); see also id. cmt. f (discussing
analysis under Washington Minimum Wage Act, which requires consideration of "whether, as a
matter of economic reality, the worker is economically dependent upon the alleged employer or
is instead in business for himself" and quoting Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.,
281 P.3d 289, 300 (Wash. 2012) (en banc)).
140. See Noah D. Zatz, Does Work Law Have a Future if the Labor Market Does Not?, 91
CHt.-KENT L. REV. 1081, 1094 (2()16) (observing that "[t]he most difficult cases for applying
employment law to Uber are those in which drivers are not, in practice, especially dependent on
Uber for their livelihood").
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The proper classification of workers in the app-based economy
has generated a significant amount of scholarly commentary. Much of
this commentary - like the above discussion - is focused on Uber,
presumably because of Uber's dominance in the app-based economy.
Some commentators have persuasively argued that Uber drivers
qualify as employees under existing tests,14' but that is certainly not
the only view.14 2 To the extent that there is a dominant view among
labor and employment scholars, it seems to be that the difficulty of
applying the traditional factors makes that approach wholly
unsatisfactory; this group often advocates for new approaches to
distinguishing independent contractors from employees,143 or to
regulating work in the app-based economy altogether.'"
141. See, e.g., Ross Eisenbrey & Lawrence Mishel, Uber Business Model Does Not Justify
"Independent Worker" Category, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.epi.org/pub
lication/uber-business-model-does-not-justify-a-new-independent-worker-category/ (stating th t
"[w]e do believe for a host of reasons that Uber drivers are employees"); Benjamin Sachs, Do
We Need an "Independent Worker" Category?, ONLABOR (Dec. 8, 2015), <https://onlabor.Org
/2015/12/08/do-we-need-an-independent-worker-category/>.
142. See, e.g., Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating Employment Relationships in the Sharing
Economy, 20 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, (2016) (stating that the relationship between
suppliers and platforms "most likely doesn't reach the level of the Employee-Employer tie
under current laws"); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting
Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 479, 496 (2016) (stating that "Uber and Lyft drivers
are neither clearly employees nor clearly independent contractors under existing tests, as
typically understood," but arguing that as a normative matter, drivers should be deemed
employees).
143. See, e.g., Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1511, 1515 (2016) (arguing that "existing laws fail to provide adequate guidance
regarding the distinction between independent contractors and employees, especially when
applied to the hybrid working arrangements common in a modern economy," and arguing that
"the classification of workers as independent contractors or employees should be shaped by an
overarching inquiry: How much flexibility do individuals have in determining the time, place,
price, manner, and frequency of the work they perform?"); Jeremias Prassi & Martin Risak,
Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms and Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of
Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 619, 620 (2016) ("Instead of dwelling on the well-
rehearsed debates as to employee or independent contractor status ... by adopting a functional
concept of the employer, we suggest, the courts might be able to sidestep the current impasse
and allocate rights and responsibilities in a flexible, yet coherent manner."); Robert Sprague,
Worker (Mis)classification in the Sharing Economy: Trying to Fit Square Pegs into Round Holes,
31 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53, 54 (2015) (arguing that "current classification tests... fail when
applied to new, sharing-economy enterprises," and instead advocating that "analysis of work in
the sharing economy should turn from the worker's dependence on the company to the
company's dependence on the worker").
144. See, e.g., HARRIS & KREUGER, supra note 113. But see Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio
Aloisi, "Dependent Contractors" in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L.
REv. 635 (2017) (discussing the results of the creation of a category of worker between
independent contractor and employee in several other countries).
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B. Court & Agency Decisions on App-Based Economy Worker
Classification
Most courts and agencies have yet to reach final decisions on the
merits of whether workers in the app-based economy are employees
or independent contractors, and even conclusive agency decisions
concerning individual workers are not necessarily generalizable to
other workers. Moreover, as of the date this article went to print, the
authors were not aware of any U.S. state or federal decisions
regarding app-based worker classification at the appellate court level.
Thus, it is too early to say whether or when a consensus will emerge
regarding the classification of these workers. Moreover, app-based
economy companies are constantly adjusting their business models in
response to legal developments, so their methods of workforce
management are moving targets. Accordingly, this Section has a
modest goal: it describes the court and agency decisions that have
addressed the status of app-based economy workers,145 highlighting
their approaches to app-based worker classification. As will become
apparent, nearly all of these decisions to date concern for-hire
drivers.46
1. Court Decisions
To our knowledge, there are not yet any U.S. court decisions
involving the alleged misclassification of app-based economy workers
that conclusively determine their status.147 Among other barriers to
145. This Section does not discuss other classification cases in which, at least as of the date
of publication, their respective courts have not reached classification questions at even the
summary judgment stage. Some of these cases settled before a court could issue a decision
addressing the merits of the classification question; in others, the parties are litigating other
issues, including motions to compel arbitration. Moreover, it does not discuss cases that have
not resulted in decisions beyond the motion to dismiss stage, beyond noting their existence. For
an excellent and comprehensive overview of other app-based economy cases, see Cherry, supra
note 125, at 583.
146. One quasi-exception is Tan v. Grubhub, Inc., concerning alleged employees of a food-
delivery service. The court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, concluding that the
plaintiff adequately alleged an employment relationship, and set the case for trial in June 2017.
Tan v. Grubhub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (noting that defendants did not
dispute that plaintiffs adequately pled misclassification); Order re: Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, Tan v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 15-cv-05128-JSC, 2016 WL
3743365 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2016); Pretrial Order No. 1, No. 15-cv-05128-JSC (N.D. Cal. Sept.
16, 2016), available at <https://scholar.google.com/scholar-case?case=9077343749616302038q
=tan+v.+grubhub&hl=en&assdt=6,26&asvis=1>.
147. An English employment tribunal has conclusively determined that at least when the
app is turned on, Uber drivers are employees of Uber. Aslam v. Uber [2016] Case Nos.
2202550/2015 & Others (Emp. Trib.), available at <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2016/10/aslam-and-farrar-v-uber-reasons-20161028.pdf>.
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judicial resolution, the ubiquity of arbitration clauses that apply to
such workers mean that misclassification claims filed in courts tend to
get bogged down in motions to compel arbitration, which are
frequently granted.'8
Nonetheless, the Northern District of California has held that
misclassification claims brought by Uber and Lyft drivers under
California law were at least sufficient to survive summary judgment,
and appropriate for resolution by a jury.'49 On the same day, two
judges of that court issued decisions denying the companies'
respective motions for summary judgment;o these two cases are also
the furthest developed of the cases raising app-based for-hire drivers'
employment status, and therefore the primary cases discussed in this
Subsection. However, many other misclassification cases exist, and
they fall into two categories: first, cases involving workers' eligibility
for benefits and protections that hinge on employee status; .51 and
second, cases in which customers seek to impose respondeat superior
liability on companies as a result of drivers' misconduct.5 2 As the
Working Group observed in 2009, it is not necessarily the case that
the same considerations should govern both groups of cases: to the
contrary, as the Working Group stated, respondeat superior principles
are "not the best way to go about defining 'employee' in any general
sense.""' At a minimum, the two sets of cases involve different policy
148. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 863 F.3d 1102, 1112-14 (9th Cir. 2016)
(holding Uber's arbitration agreement is enforceable as to most claims in case alleging violation
of, inter alia, the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
149. California law contains a presumption of employee status, and uses a multi-factor test
emphasizing the putative employer's right to control the details of the putative employee's
work. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc., v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 406-07 (Cal. 1989).
150. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O'Connor v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
151. See, e.g., Tan v. GrubHub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Razak v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2016 WL 5874822 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2016) (holding that plaintiffs
adequately pleaded that they were misclassified as independent contractors in FLSA case);
Alatraqchi v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. C-13-03156, 2013 WL 4517756 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013)
(dismissing complaint without prejudice "so that Plaintiff may clearly . .. allege the nature of his
relationship with Uber," and declining to rule as a matter of law that Uber drivers are
independent contractors).
152. See, e.g., Doe v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 15-cv-04670-SI, 2016 WL 2348296 (N.D. Cal.
May 4, 2016) (concluding, at motion to dismiss stage, that plaintiffs alleging assault by Uber
drivers "have alleged sufficient facts to claim plausibly that an employment relationship exists");
Search v. Uber Tech., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (D.D.C. 2015) (declining to dismiss claim
involving plaintiff who was stabbed by Uber driver, because "a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Uber exercised control over [driver] in a manner evincing an employer-employee
relationship" (alteration added)).
153. Working Group, supra note 1, at 47 (contrasting the Restatement's reliance on
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, on "Definition of Servant," with Restatement (Third) of
Agency § 7.07, on "Employee Acting Within Scope of Employment" for purposes of respondeat
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considerations; for example, only the second group of cases requires
factfinders and policymakers to balance the interests and expectations
of third-party plaintiffs.
The Cotter v. Lyft court began its ruling by remarking on the
difficulty of the ultimate classification question, noting that the
drivers "don't seem much like employees," but also "don't seem
much like independent contractors either."'" This observation
seemingly reflected the court's perception that it was difficult to
square Lyft drivers with the court's "gut instincts" regarding either
employees or independent contractors, rather than dissatisfaction
with the governing legal test. In discussing those expectations, the
court began by discussing the ultimate purpose of classifying workers
as either independent contractors or employees: "[i]ndependent
contractors do not receive [employment] protections because they
generally are in a far more advantageous positions" than
employees."' Or, per a source that the Cotter court quoted at some
length, "a true contractor does not suffer the effects of unequal
bargaining power to any degree comparable to that suffered by
employees.""6 In our view, this is a useful frame to guide
decisionmaking in this new and challenging context, and the
Restatement missed an opportunity by failing to adopt a similar
framing of the purpose of employee status. To be sure, similar
considerations are at times implicit in the Restatement, but they
should have been expanded upon and made more prominent as
drivers of the various multi-factor tests of employment status."
In both O'Connor and Cotter, the companies unsuccessfully
pressed the argument that the drivers could not possibly qualify as
employees, because they did not even perform services for the
companies."' The Cotter court called this argument "obviously
superior).
154. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069.
155. Id. at 1074.
156. Id. (quoting Ruth Burdick, Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider
Additional Factors of Entrepreneurial Independence and the Relative Dependence of Employees
When Determining Independent Contractor Status Under Section 2(3), 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 75, 130 (1997)).
157. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.01 cmts. d, e (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (observing
that where an employer exercises the "power" to "control the manner and means by which an
individual renders services," the employee "generally cannot further his or her economic
interest"; and that "independent businessperson-service providers are in a different economic
position from employee-service providers").
158. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078; O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141
(N.D. Cal. 2015).
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wrong."'59 For its part, the O'Connor court gave the argument more
detailed consideration, but still rejected it based on "logic and
common sense," as well as caselaw.16 Further, both courts observed
that the respective companies marketed themselves as ride or
transportation services."' This conclusion - and the ease and certainty
with which both courts reached it - is significant, both for future cases
in which app-based economy companies make similar arguments, and
because California law contains a presumption that workers who
perform services for companies are employees of those companies.
Thus, in the home of the app-based economy, workers will often
benefit from presumptive employee status under state law. Moreover,
the question of whether app-based economy workers and companies
are in the same business is relevant to workers' classifications under
many statutes and in many jurisdictions; these cases should be
persuasive authority, and future Restatements hould endorse their
approach.
Turning to drivers' working conditions, the Cotter court focused
primarily on the ways in which Lyft controlled drivers' service,
including by issuing a pamphlet of "rules to live by," which included
such minutiae as "[g]reet every passenger with a big smile and a fist
bump," and "[k]eep your seats and truck clear for use by your
passengers."1 62 These and other instructions to Lyft drivers were more
comprehensive than those issued by Uber to its drivers; still, the
O'Connor court observed that Uber sought to control behavior such
as "whether drivers 'have an umbrella in [their] car for clients." 3
While the Cotter court seemed fairly certain that the facts in the Lyft
case showed that the extent of control that the company exercised
over drivers "tends to cut" in favor of employee status,'" the
O'Connor court was more circumspect, leaving the extent of Uber's
control over drivers for the factfinder to consider at trial.65
Nonetheless, the O'Connor court noted that Uber's "level of
monitoring, where drivers are potentially observable at all times,
arguably gives Uber a tremendous amount of control over the
159. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.
160. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1143.
161. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078; O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141-42.
162. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1072.
163. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149 (internal quotation marks and alteration in original).
164. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1079.
165. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1151.
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'manner and means' of its drivers' performance."'66 Finally, both the
Lyft and Uber courts concluded that other factors relating to
employee status were more mixed; in the companies' favors, the
courts pointed to the facts that drivers use their own cars and set their
own routes and schedules.'67
Ultimately, these cases should give app-based economy
companies pause. They suggest that those companies' algorithmically
based management systems are - at least from a legal standpoint -
less "disruptive" of traditional employment relationships than the
companies have claimed. However, as the next Subsection discusses,
their track record before state agencies is more mixed.
2. Agency Decisions and Guidance
Various state agencies have also had the opportunity to consider
whether app-based economy workers are employees. For example,
individual Uber drivers have sought unemployment benefits in a list
of states, requiring states to decide whether they are employees as a
threshold matter. While many of these decisions are not public, Uber
reports that it has prevailed in cases involving individual drivers in
eight states: Georgia, Pennsylvania, Colorado, Indiana, Texas, New
York, Illinois, and California.'68 In addition, a UK employment
tribunal recently issued a detailed merits decision concluding that
Uber drivers were employees entitled to receive minimum wage and
paid leave.'69 That tribunal first observed that it is "unreal to deny that
Uber is in business as a supplier of transportation services.",o It went
on to write that:
the notion that Uber in London is a mosaic of 30,000 small
businesses linked by a common "platform" is to our minds faintly
ridiculous. In each case, the "business" consists of a man with a car
seeking to make a living by driving it. [Uber's attorney] spoke of
Uber assisting the drivers to "grow" their businesses, but no driver
is in a position to do anything of the kind, unless growing his
business simply means spending more hours at the wheel. Nor can
166. Id. (citing MICHEL FOUCALT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Alan Sheridan ed., 1979)).
167. Id. at 1153; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. at 1081.
168. Heather Somerville, Former Uber Driver Was an Employee, Rules California
Department, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2016, 11:44 PM), <http://www.reuters.com/article/uber-tech-calif
omia-ruling-idUSL1N11FlKT20150910>.
169. Aslam v Uber, [2016] Case Nos. 2202550/2015 & Others (Emp. Trib.), available at
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/aslam-and-farrar-v-uber-reasons-20
161028.pdf>.
170. Id. para. 88.
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Uber's function sensibly be characterized as supplying drivers with
"leads." That suggests that the driver is put into contact with a
possible passenger with whom he has the opportunity to negotiate
and strike a bargain. But drivers do not and cannot negotiate with
passengers (except to agree to a reduction of the fare set b Uber).
They are offered and accept trips strictly on Uber's terms.
Reaching the opposite conclusion, the Florida Department of
Economic Opportunity held that an Uber driver was an independent
contractor who was therefore ineligible for Florida's "reemployment
assistance" benefit.12 Key to the opinion was the Department's
conclusion that Uber was a "middleman"; in the Department's words,
"Uber is no more an employer to drivers than is an art gallery to
artists.""' In our view, this analogy is beside the point; presumably, an
art gallery could employ an artist or contract with her, depending on
how their relationship was structured. Moreover, the decision applied
the Restatement of Agency factors1 7 4 in a manner inconsistent with the
Restatement of Employment Law; specifically, the Department first
looked to "the agreement between the parties," crediting the parties'
own characterization of their relationship even though the Uber
driver agreement was an adhesion contract. We think Florida's
approach is badly flawed because the key consideration described by
the Cotter court - whether a driver is or is not in an "advantageous
position" vis-A-vis his putative employer - will also often determine
whether that driver is able to negotiate the terms of his work,
including how that work is described. In other words, work contracts
describing the parties' arrangements as that of "independent
contractors" are likely to capture both arrangements where both sides
have meaningful bargaining power, and also those where the opposite
is true.
In any event, with the likely exception of the Florida decision,
the decisions rejecting Uber drivers' unemployment applications may
not be generalizable to all drivers in the relevant states, a point that is
171. Id. para. 90 (footnotes omitted).
172. Raiser LLC v. Fla. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, Protest of Liability Nos. 0026 2825 90-
02, 0026 2834 68-02, & 0026 2850 33-02 (Exec. Dir. Dec. 3, 2015), available at <http://miami
herald.typepad.com/fi1es/uber-final-order-12-3-15.pdf>, affd on review sub nom., McGillis v.
Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, No. 3D15-2758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017), available at
<https://casetext.com/case/mcgillis-v-dept-of-econ-opportunity>.
173. Id. at 2. The O'Connor court specifically rejected the "middleman" analogy. O'Connor
v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1143 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
174. Raiser LLC, Protest of Liability Nos. 0026 2825 90-02, 0026 2834 68-02, & 0026 2850
33-02, at 7 (quoting Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel, 667 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1995)).
175. Although the Florida decision on its face concerns only three Uber drivers, it relies on
facts that seem to us to be applicable to all Uber drivers.
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underscored by the fact that two of those states - New York and
California - have also ruled that other Uber drivers are employees
who qualify for unemployment or other benefits.'76 In addition,
California has generated an "Employment Relationship
Questionnaire" tailored to Uber drivers, which prompts drivers to
answer a list of eighty-nine separate questions related to their
relationship with Uber.'" Alaska and Oregon officials have also
signaled that they regard Uber drivers to be employees under their
respective state laws; a commissioner of the Oregon Bureau of Labor
& Industries issued a non-binding opinion indicating that under
Oregon's "economic realities" test, "Uber drivers are employees.",7 1
And Alaska settled a workers' compensation investigation with Uber
on terms that require the company to pay nearly $80,000 to the state
and agree not to contract with drivers in the state again, unless
Alaska law is changed to specifically exempt Uber from workers'
compensation requirements.17 9
This discussion has sought to outline some of the key questions
in determining whether app-based economy workers are employees
or independent contractors - few of which are discussed in necessary
detail in the Restatement. This issue is sure to attract more focused
attention from courts, agencies, and legislatures in the coming years,
including from the NLRB, before which is pending several complaints
alleging that Uber drivers are employees. The NLRB's analysis is
particularly significant in light of the Board's rule that employees
cannot be required to sacrifice their right to address their
employment-related disputes on a class basis in either arbitration or
litigation;... this rule could prompt merits decisions in other
jurisdictions by invalidating near-ubiquitous app-based economy
176. Doe v. Uber, No. 5371509 (Cal. Unemp't Ins. Appeals Bd. June 1, 2016); Uber Tech.,
Inc. v. Berwick, No. 11-46739 EK (Cal. Labor Comm'r June 3, 2015); Noam Scheiber, Uber
Drivers Ruled Eligible for Jobless Payments in New York State, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2016),
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/business/state-rules-2-former-uber-drivers-eligible-for-job
less-payments.html?_r=1>.
177. Employment Relationship Questionnaire, available at <https://www.scribd.com/doc
/302246376/Uber-employment-Relationship-Questionnaire-1>.
178. Advisory Opinion of the Comm'r of the Bureau of Labor & Indus. of the State of Ore.,
Regarding the Employment Status of Uber Drivers (Oct. 14, 2015), available at <https://www.or
egon.gov/boli/SiteAssets/pages/press/101415%20Advisory%200pinion%20on%20the%2OEmp
loyment%20Status%20of%20Uber%20Drivers.pdf>.
179. In the Matter of the Petition for a Finding of the Failure to Insure Workers'
Compensation Liability, And Assessment of a Civil Penalty Against, Uber Technologies, Inc.,
and Rasier LLC, Respondents, No. 15-0093, 2015 WL 4699265 (Alaska Workers Comp. Bd. July
31, 2015).
180. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 619 (2014).
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individual arbitration agreements that will otherwise stymie the
generation of precedent in this area. We think the Restatement offers
some useful guidance to decision-makers grappling with these issues,
but that it did not do all that it could to promote consistency and
justice. In particular, a clearly articulated statement regarding the
various purposes of the employee/independent contractor dichotomy
in different contexts would have been useful to decision makers, and
would have promoted justice by making it more difficult for
enterprises to evade employer status by offloading supervision tasks
onto customers and control onto algorithms.
V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
In its earlier work, the Working Group identified several other
areas as to which it urged that the Restatement should be changed or
clarified. While some of those suggestions were taken, others were
not. Significantly, many of our remaining concerns arise with respect
to the Restatement's descriptions of the reasons for various principles;
in our view, some of these descriptions are under-theorized, and
therefore miss an opportunity to guide the development of common
law by providing a robust conceptual framework. As a complement to
this discussion, we encourage readers to revisit the Working Group's
earlier article.
1. Volunteers. The Working Group critiqued the draft
Restatement's assertion that, at least for purposes of certain
employment protections and benefits, volunteers are not employees
because they "have not made the same kind of commitment to the
service recipient or the same sort of investment in their relationship
as do employees.""' As the Working Group put it, this assertion is
problematic for two reasons: first, "the assumption underlying the
rationale that long term commitment to the employer is an
appropriate prerequisite to the protections offered by employment
laws is not self-evident"; and second, many volunteers provide
services to organizations for decades precisely because of their
commitment to the service recipient." One can imagine employees
(such as social workers) who at least sometimes perform work similar
to the work done by some volunteers out of similar ideological
commitments; conversely, one can equally easily imagine employees
181. Working Group, supra note 1, at 50-51; see also RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.02
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
182. Working Group, supra note 1, at 50-51.
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who have only a tenuous commitment to a short-term job. Thus, our
view is that a new theoretical basis is needed to distinguish employees
from volunteers that avoids resting on either ideological commitment
to the work, or on the circular proposition that volunteers are unpaid
or do not expect payment.
2. Prisoners. Similarly, the Working Group suggested that the
Restatement should give a more comprehensive accounting of both
principles and decisions underlying the treatment of prison labor.183
However, this discussion remains scant. For example, the Restatement
asserts that "[p]resumably, extending employment laws to work done
under a prison's control pursuant to a penal sentence could threaten
prison discipline and conflict with the imposition of punishment."'
But it is not obvious why this is true with respect to either
employment benefits or protections, as the Working Group
explained; to give one obvious counter-example, a prison policy of
assigning prisoners of only one race to jobs or paying different rates
to prisoners of different races would likely exacerbate prison conflict,
in addition to violating the Constitution." At minimum, we think
prison systems should bear the burden of justifying to a court why
they should be exempt from particular employment obligations that
they would otherwise owe to prisoner workers, and that the
Restatement erred in simply assuming that the justification for such
exemptions exist.'" Finally, we note that the Restatement does little to
explore the effects of prison labor on the free labor market.'87
3. Controlling Owners. As the Working Group pointed out, the
black-letter rule does not accurately reflect the law as explained in
section 1.03 of the Restatement. Specifically, the black letter rule
suggests that part ownership in itself means that the putative
employee is a controlling owner. Yet the subsequent text makes clear
183. Id. at 60-63.
184. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.02 cmt. c, reporters' note.
185. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 507-08 (2005) (holding that strict scrutiny
applies to racial classifications of prisoners).
186. While the procedural mechanisms through which prisoners would enforce their
employment rights are beyond the scope of this article, we observe that the conflict and disorder
that the Restatement predicts could also be mediated by the effects of prison grievance systems
and limits on prisoner access to courts. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012) (Prison Litigation
Reform Act).
187. See, e.g., NOAH ZATZ ET AL., UCLA INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR & EMP'T,
UCLA LABOR CTR., A NEW WAY OF LIFE REENTRY PROJECT, RESEARCH BRIEF: GET TO
WORK OR GO TO JAIL: WORKPLACE RIGHTS UNDER THREAT (2016), <http://www.labor
.ucla.eduldownloads/get-to-work-or-go-to-jail/>; Noah Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or
Go to Jail in Contemporary Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
927 (2016).
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that that, in fact, the worker must actually exercise control over
"significant economic and operational decisions."" Given the risk
that a harried lawyer or judge may fail to read the commentary as
closely as would be ideal, the mismatch between that commentary
and the black-letter statement is unfortunate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an area as fast moving as employment law, it was nearly
inevitable that events would begin to overtake the Restatement as
soon as it hit shelves. This article has discussed key areas in which
subsequent events have indeed called into question the adequacy of
the Restatement's approach to aspects of defining employment
relationships. In our view, this lack of durability is in large part
attributable to the Restatement's failure to contextualize the rules and
standards it articulates, which in turn makes it more difficult for
decision-makers to apply them in new situations. Thus, our
recommendation is that decision-makers grappling with questions of
whether an employment relationship exists begin with that
fundamental question.
188. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 1.03 cmt. a.
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